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WHEN FAIR IS FouL: FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCING
N THE WAKE OF UNITED STATES V. LABONTE
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you have just been tried and convicted for distri-
bution of cocaine.' Several days later, you meet with your attorney
to discuss the pending sentencing hearing. Your attorney explains
that because you have two prior convictions for such acts, the
judge is obligated to impose a longer sentence than a first time
offender would receive. Then comes the bad news. Because the
prosecutor elected to file a sentence enhancement,2 your criminal
history is counted against you twice under the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines").3 Had the prosecutor decided
Distribution of cocaine is a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994).
z In drug cases, the prosecutor has unfettered discretion when deciding whether to
enhance the criminal's sentence because of his recidivist status. This is made clear by the
express language of 21 U.S.C. § 851(b), which states: "If the United States attorney files
an information under this section, the court shall ... inquire of the [defendant] . . .
whether he affirms or denies that he has previously been convicted as alleged in the in-
formation" 21 U.S.C. §851(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
3- See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GumE.INEs
MANuAL (1996) [hereinafter GuiDELINES]. The Guidelines were created by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-
998 (1994)). They are the means by which all sentences for those convicted of federal
crimes are calculated.
The heart of the Guidelines is the "Sentencing Table," a 258 cell matrix that is
centered around a horizontal and vertical axis. The horizontal axis is divided into six lev-
els that pertain to the defendant's "criminal history category." The longer the defendant's
record, the higher the corresponding criminal history category and the longer the term of
imprisonment The vertical axis is divided into 43 "offense levels." Each federal crime is
assigned a "base offense level." As with the criminal history category, the higher the base
offense level, the longer the term of imprisonment A sentence is calculated by finding
the intersection of the offense level of conviction and the defendant's criminal history cat-
egory.
The Guidelines were created to ensure certainty and fairness in sentencing. See 28
U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (1994). "Fairness" is defined as "avoiding unwarranted sentencing dis-
parities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
against filing the enhancement, your criminal record would have
only been increased once, resulting in a substantially shorter term
of incarceration.
In United States v. LaBonte,4 the Supreme Court guaranteed
that the scenario described above will be repeated ad infinitum.
The issue in LaBonte was whether a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. §
994(h), conflicted with Amendment 506 (the "Amendment") to the
Guidelines. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
The [United States Sentencing] Commission shall assure
that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of impris-
onment at or near the maximum term authorized for cate-
gories of defendants in which the defendant is eighteen
years old or older and [has been convicted of a crime of
violence or a felony drug offense and has at least two such
prior convictions].'
The United States Sentencing Commission (the "Commission")
responded to this direction by enacting the Career Offender Guide-
line.6 Through the use of a two-step process, the Career Offender
Guideline requires career offenders to be sentenced differently from
first time offenders.' First, career offenders are automatically as-
signed to the highest criminal history level.8 Second, the offense
level is determined by taking the statute's maximum penalty and
inserting it into a "Table of Offenses" found in this section. Prior
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences."
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994).
4 117 S. Ct. 1673 (1997).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994) (emphasis added). Congress requires the United States
Sentencing Commission, the author of the Guidelines, to periodically review and amend
the Guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (1994) ("The Commission periodically shall review
and revise, in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines
promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this section.").
The Commission is an independent division of.the judicial branch. See 28 U.S.C. §
991(a) (1994). It consists of seven voting members, all of whom are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. See id.
See GuIDELiNEs, supra note 3, § 4B1.1. At that section, the Guidelines state:
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen
years old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense is a felony
that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of vio-
lence or a controlled substance offense.
Id.
. See supra note 3 for an explanation of how the Guidelines operate.
See supra note 3.
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to Amendment 506, the commentary9 to the Career Offender
Guideline stated: "'Offense Statutory Maximum' refers to the maxi-
mum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction
that is a crime of violence or controlled substance offense."' 0
In 1994, the Amendment revised this commentary. It stated:
Offense statutory maximum ... refers to the maximum
term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of convic-
tion... not including any increase in that maximum term
under a sentencing enhancement provision that applies
because of the defendant's prior criminal record."
Amendment 506 was written in response to the enhanced maximum
sentences provided for recidivist drug offenders. Prior to the
Amendment, when defendants were convicted of narcotics felonies,
an "unenhanced statutory maximum" was used for first time of-
fenders while an "enhanced statutory maximum" was used for
recidivists. 2  The Amendment required judges to use the
unenhanced maximum penalty regardless of the defendant's status
as a recidivist.
The Commission's rationale for Amendment 506 was to
"avoidl unwarranted double counting as well as unwarranted dis-
parity associated with variations in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion."' 3 Before the Amendment's enactment, all courts used
the enhanced statutory maximum. 4 As amended, the interpretive
I The Commission often includes "commentary" to help explain the various provi-
sions:
The Commentary that accompanies the guideline sections may serve a number
of purposes. First, it may interpret the guideline or explain how it is to be
applied .... Second, the commentary may suggest circumstances which ...
may warrant departure from the guidelines . . . .Finally, the commentary may
provide background information, including.. reasons underlying promulgation
of the guideline.
GUIDELINES, supra note 3, § 1B1.7.
Ia See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoMMIssION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINEs MANUAL § 4B1.1 (1992).
I'. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GuIDELINES MAN-
UAL app. C., at 804-05 (1994) (emphasis added).
22 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) is the sentencing statute for drug offenses. It states that
anyone convicted under it "shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more
than 20 years [but] . . . [i]f any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction
for a felony drug offense . . . such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of not more than 30 years." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994). Thus, the potential dis-
crepancy in sentences for the same offense could be as great as ten years.
. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 804-05.
't See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1395 (5th Cir. 1993); United
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commentary conflicted with this case law. Since the Commission's
interpretive commentary of its own work-product is authoritative
unless it conflicts with the Constitution, a federal statute, or is a
plainly erroneous reading of the guideline section,' the LaBonte
Court granted certiorari to determine whether it was possible to
reconcile the Amendment with 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).
This Comment will examine the Supreme Court's decision in
LaB onte and argue that the case was incorrectly decided. Part I
will discuss the status of the case law and the Guidelines prior to
LaBonte. Part II will analyze more deeply the Court's decision in
LaBonte and examine the rationales that the majority and dissent
used to reach their conclusions. An analysis of these rationales will
follow in Part I. Special attention will be paid to the inconsisten-
cies within the majority's opinion and the majority's divergence
from the principles of punishment. The Comment will conclude in
Part IV with a call to return to the original language of Amend-
ment 506.
I. THE ROAD TO LABONTE
A. The Sentencing Guidelines
One of the primary dissatisfactions with criminal sentencing in
the United States has been the "historical disagreement over the
primary purpose of punishment."'16 The disagreement relates to
which of the four main theories of punishment, i.e. retribution, 7
deterrence," incapacitation, 9 or rehabilitation,' is the most effi-
States v. Smith, 984 F.2d 1084, 1086-87 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Saunders, 973
F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Garrett, 959 F.2d 1005, 1010 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); United States v. Anis, 926 F.2d 328, 329 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 560 (9th Cir. 1989).
I. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
16 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1938, 1940 (1988) (critiquing the Guidelines).
'" "The retributive view rests on the idea that it is right for the wicked to be pun-
ished. because man is responsible for his actions, he ought to receive his just deserts."
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE Limrrs oF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 37 (1968).
"8 There are two subsets of the "deterrence" theory. "General deterrence justifies sen-
tences in the name of discouraging the general public from recourse to crime," while
"[s]pecial deterrence defends criminal penalties as a way to disincline individual offenders
from repeating the same or other criminal acts." ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAw OF SEN-
TENCING § 2:2 (2d ed. 1991).
19. "The rationale of incapacitation declares society need not fear offenders who are
rendered physically incapable of committing crime." Id. § 2:3.
Rehabilitation's "justification for punishment is the claim that it may be used to
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cacious. During the 1950s, rehabilitation was favored," but begin-
ning in the 1970s, "[r]ehabilitation as a sound penological theory
came to be questioned and.. . was regarded by some as an unat-
tainable goal for most cases." Although Congress has always had
the power to set the sentence for federal crimes,' it has tradition-
ally delegated enormous sentencing discretion to federal judges2
The problem with this delegation is that it led to unconscionable
disparities in the sentences of otherwise similarly situated defen-
dants. 5
In light of the failure to subscribe to any one particular theory
of punishment and the disparities resulting from judicial discretion,
Congress determined that federal sentencing was in need of reform.
The solution to the problem was the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (the "SRA").' This legislation resulted in the establishment
of the United States Sentencing Commission and the subsequent
creation of the Guidelines. When first drafting the Guidelines, the
prevent crime by so changing the personality of the offender that he will conform to the
dictates of law." PACKER, supra note 17, at 53.
2. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Retribution is no longer
the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders
have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."); see also Ogletree, supra note
16, at 1941 ("During the 1950's, the predominant judicial philosophy of punishment, as
well as the prevailing view of penologists, favored the concepts of deterrence and rehabili-
tation.").
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989); see also NORVAL MORRIS,
Tm FuruRE OF IMPRISONMENT 26 (1974) ("Mhe rehabilitative ideal is not acceptable as
a purpose of punishment.").
2' See United States v. wViltberger, 18 US. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) ("It is the leg-
islatue... which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.").
2A See United States v. Greyson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1978) (discussing the history of
sentencing in the United States).
I When debating whether to create the Commission, Congress heard a considerable
amount of testimony on sentencing disparities. One of the most compelling statements was
given by one of the Sentencing Commissioners:
Mhe region in which the defendant is convicted is likely to change the length
of time served from approximately six months more if one is sentenced in the
South to twelve months less if one is sentenced in Central California ....
[B]lack [bank robbery] defendants convicted... in the South are likely to
serve approximately thirteen months longer than similarly situated bank robbers
convicted . . . in other regions.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the
Judciary, 100th Cong., 554, 676-77 (1987) (testimony of lene H. Nagel, U.S. Sentencing
Commissioner).
1, Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1994)
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994)).
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Commission's Chair, Judge William M. Wilkins, stated that
"[u]nwarranted [sentencing] disparity I believe is the single major
problem in our system, which resulted in the creation of the Sen-
tencing Commission." Aside from the elimination of unwarranted
sentencing disparities, Congress instructed the courts to consider all
four of the traditional goals of sentencing when imposing a sen-
tence' and expressed its concern that the sentences historically
imposed "[did] not accurately reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense[s]."29 The creation of the Guidelines required the balancing
of many competing interests,'e yet the Commission created a con-
stitutionally valid sentencing system3' that has been in place for a
decade.
B. The Circuit Decisions
Prior to the Supreme Court's LaBonte decision, there was a
five-to-two split among the circuits as to whether Amendment 506
was valid.
21- UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION: UNPUBLISHED PUBLIC HEARINGS 3
(1986) (United States Sentencing Commission, Public Hearings on Offense Seriousness,
Apr. 15, 1986); see also William W. Wilkins & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing
Guideline Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 63, 87 (1993) ("No purpose was more important to Congress and the several Ad-
ministrations that worked for years to enact the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 than the
avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparity and resulting unfairness in the sentencing of
similarly situated defendants."). The elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparities was
not the Commission's only goal. Chairman Wilkins also stated that "[tihese policies and
guidelines will be designed... to create a determinant sentencing system which may ap-
propriately be entitled Truth in Sentencing, with the aims of certainty, [and] faimess."
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION: UNPUBLISHED PUBLIC HEARINGS, supra, at 2.
' Courts are directed to consider the need for the sentence (1) to reflect the serious-
ness of the offense and to provide just punishment for the offense, (2) to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct, (3) to protect the public from further crimes of the defen-
dant, and (4) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1994).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(i) (1994) (expressing con-
gressional desire for longer federal sentences).
3' See United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673, 1680 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("The upshot is a Guidelines system that balances various, sometimes conflicting, general
goals."). For a full discussion of the compromises that were made in the creation of the
Guidelines, see Steven Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compro-
mises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
"' See United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) ("We conclude that in
creating the Sentencing Commission . . . Congress neither delegated excessive power nor
upset the constitutionally mandated balance of power among the coordinate Branch-
es .... Accordingly, we hold that the Act is constitutional.").
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1. The Circuits Holding Amendment 506 Valid
Both the First Circuite2 and the Ninth Circuite3 upheld the va-
lidity of Amendment 506; however, the First Circuit's LaBonte
opinion is more useful for the analytical purposes of this Com-
ment." In LaBonte, the First Circuit considered the Commission's
status as a federal agency and applied Chevron v. United States,3
"the traditional process of reviewing agency rules."'36 A Chevron
analysis involves the determination of two issues: First, it must be
determined "whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue. If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter."37 In
the event that "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the [second] question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."'3 In order to determine whether Amendment 506 conflict-
ed with 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), the First Circuit applied the Chevron
test twice; first to determine the appropriate definitions of the
words "categories" and "maximum"'39 and again to determine the
meaning of the phrase "at or near."
When defining the term "categories," the LaBonte court deter-
mined that "[o]ne possible reading is that 'categories' are com-
posed of those defendants charged with violations of similar stat-
utes against whom prosecutors have filed notices of intention to
3" See United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396 (1st Cir. 1995). It should be noted
that the First Circuit was divided on this issue.
3 See United States v. Dunn, 80 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1996).
In Dunn, the court observed:
Virtually everything that could be said in analysis of this case has been said
by Judge Selya writing for the majority and Judge Stahl dissenting in United
States v. LaBonte. We find Judge Selya's analysis more persuasive and refer to
the history of the statute and the comprehensive treatment therein as confirma-
tory of our conclusion.
Dunn, 80 F.3d at 404 (citation omitted).
35 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Supreme Court "recognized . . . the princi-
ple of deference to administrative interpretations." Id. at 844. Since the United States Sen-
tencing Commission is an administrative agency, see supra note 5, it was presumably en-
titled to deference in this situation.
LaBonte, 70 F.3d at 1403.
" Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
Id. at 843.
31 The LaBonte court combined the interpretation of "categories" and "maximum" into
one application of Chevron. See LaBonte, 70 F3d at 1404 ("The first application com-
bines two issues; it concerns the explication of the word 'maximum' as that word is used
in section 994(h) and, concomitantly, the meaning of the word 'categories' as used there-
in.").
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seek sentence enhancements."' If this were the correct interpreta-
tion, then the appropriate sentencing decision would be to use the
enhanced statutory maximum. However, "this reading is not lin-
guistically compelled. The word 'categories' plausibly can be de-
fined more broadly to include all offenders... charged with trans-
gressing the same criminal statute, regardless of whether the prose-
cution chooses to invoke the sentence-enhancing mechanism against
a particular defendant."'4' By opting for the latter view,42 the First
Circuit took the first step toward upholding the validity of Amend-
ment 506.
The First Circuit used Chevron a second time to define the
word "maximum." After determining that "it is simply unclear
from the bare language of the law which maximum and what cate-
gories Congress had in mind when it contrived § 994(h),"'43 the
court turned to Chevron's second step. Here, the court found rea-
son to "believe that the Commission's act in defining 'maximum'
to refer to the unenhanced statutory maximum term of imprison-
ment . . furnishes a reasonable interpretation of § 994(h),"'  and
accepted its validity.
When defining "at or near," the court observed that "[s]ection
994(h) is silent as to how 'near' sentences must be to the maxi-
mum, and the legislative history is singularly unhelpful on this
point."'45 Thus, the court turned to step two, noting that "near" is
an inherently vague term,' and that "[iln this setting, deference to
the Commission is especially appropriate."'47 As a result, the court
found that the Commission's interpretation of the phrase "at or
near" was an acceptable one" and upheld the validity of
Amendment 506.
"I Id. at 1404-05.
41. Id. at 1405.
41 See id. at 1407.
4- Id. at 1405.
Id. at 1407.
Id. at 1409.
The LaBonte majority illustrated the inherent ambiguity of the word "near": "In
speaking with a Texan, one might say that Providence is 'near' Boston, but it is doubtful
if that description would (or could) be employed in speaking with a resident of, say,
Cambridge [MA] or Cranston [RI]." l& at 1409.
4" Id. at 1409.
Id. at 1409; see also United States v. Fountain, 885 F. Supp. 185, 188 (N.D. Iowa
1995) ("Based on the generality of the phrase 'at or near' . . . I cannot find that the
Commission's definition of near . . . is not a permissible one.").
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2. The Circuits Invalidating Amendment 506
The five circuits49 that invalidated Amendment 506 defined
"categories," "maximum," and "at or near" differently from the
First and Ninth Circuits. In doing so, none of the circuits chose to
use Chevron; rather, they looked for the meaning of these terms
within the language of the statute.'e Despite the fact that this ap-
proach led these courts to disagree among themselves on issues
such as the importance of the word "categories,"' they neverthe-
less agreed that the statute calls for the use of the enhanced maxi-
mum. These courts also interpreted the legislative intent of §
994(h) differently from the First and Ninth Circuits when defining
"statutory maximum." The Sixth Circuit, for example, found that
"the plain language of § 994(h) dictates that the 'maximum term
authorized' refers to the enhanced statutory maximum."52
'. See, e.g., United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 845-46 (6th Cir. 1996); United
States v. MeQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 731-33 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Fountain, 83
F.3d 946, 950-53 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hernandez, 79 F.3d 584, 595-601 (7th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Novey, 78 F.3d 1483, 1486-88 (10th Cir. 1996).
' This is an entirely appropriate method of analysis. The Supreme Court has held
that "'[i]n determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language.'" Moskal v.
United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
580 (1981)); see also Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980) (stating that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language
of the statute itself').
51. See United States v. Hemandlez, 79 F.3d 584, 596 (7th Cir. 1996) ("'Categories' is
a rather generic term, and we are tempted to say that it has little or no particular mean-
ing within the four comers of section 994(h)."). But see United States v. Fountain, 83
F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 1996) ("It is clear to us that the crucial word in the statute is
'category' and that the meaning of the rest of the language cannot be discerned without
knowing the 'category' of defendants to which the statute [§ 994(h)] refers").
United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 846 (6th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit
has applied a similar rule:
[W]e think it clear that Congress meant the higher of the two maximums pro-
vided for in statutes like [21 U.S.C.] section 841 . . . we believe that to con-
strue the statute as referring to the unenhanced maximum departs from the
common sense of the term 'maximum,' . . . and relegates the enhanced penal-
ties Congress provided for in section 841 to the dustbin.
Hernandez, 79 F.3d at 595. Additionally, various district courts have adopted reasonings
similar to the Sixth Curcuit's in Branham. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 917 F.
Supp. 22, 27 (D.D.C. 1996) ("[ilt is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended 'maxi-
mum term authorized' to mean ... the enhanced statutory maximum."); United States v.
North, 914 F. Supp. 533, 534, 535 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("By suggesting that the phrase could
mean the unenhanced statutory maximum, the First Circuit finds ambiguity where none
exists."); United States v. Sheppard, 879 F. Supp. 80, 82 (C.D. Ill. 1995) ("The meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) is clear on its face ... [and] Amendment 506 is clearly in-
consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).").
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Despite "agree[ing] with the First Circuit that some flexibility
in the 'at or near' mandate is required, ' 3 the courts that invalidat-
ed Amendrment 506 circumvented the vagueness problem by enun-
ciating that "[tihe issue here is not how close the sentence must be
to the statutory maximum, but to which statutory maximum it must
be close. 54 These courts held that Congress intended the use of
the enhanced maximum penalties, and concluded that, therefore, the
Amendment was invalid.55
II. THE SUPREm COURT AND LABoNTE
A. The Majority
Writing for a six member majority, Justice Thomas "con-
clude[d] that the Commission's interpretation is inconsistent with §
994(h)'s plain language, and therefore ... that the 'maximum term
authorized' must be read to include all applicable statutory sentenc-
ing enhancements."'56 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court
found "little merit" in the argument that 'maximum term
authorized' refers to the unenhanced statutory maximum' be-
cause it "would largely eviscerate the penalty enhancements Con-
gress enacted in statutes such as [21 U.S.C.] § 841."' 8 The Court
dismissed the First Circuit's definition of "categories" as
"overinclusive"59 under the theory that "[tihe statutory scheme
obviously contemplates two distinct categories of repeat offend-
ers. ''W
When interpreting the "at or near" language of § 994(h), Jus-
. Hernandez, 79 F.3d at 598.
Fountain, 83 F.3d at 952; see also Hernandez, 79 F.3d at 599 ("Mhe question
presented by Amendment 506 is not how close the offense level and resulting sentencing
range must be to the statutory maximum .... The debate instead is over which statuto-
ry maximum the Commission is to aim for.").
"- See Branham, 97 F.3d at 849 ("We hold that the Commission's amendment to the
commentary accompanying § 4131.1 of the sentencing guidelines is inconsistent with the
mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) to punish recidivists 'at or near the maximum term autho-
rized,' and is therefore invalid."); Hernandez, 79 F.3d at 599 ("A pragmatic reading of
section 994(h) thus leads to this conclusion: When Congress directed the Sentencing
Commission to provide for sentences 'at or near the maximum term authorized' for per-
sons who qualify as career offenders, it meant the highest penalty for which a given de-
fendant is eligible.").
56- United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1997).
17- Id. at 1677.
Id. at 1678.
59. Id.
a Id.
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tice Thomas cited the Eighth Circuit's Fountain opinion for the
proposition that "[t]he pertinent issue ... 'is not how close the
sentence must be to the statutory maximum, but to which statutory
maximum it must be close."'61 He concluded that "[w]hatever lati-
tude § 994(h) affords the Commission in deciding how close a
sentence must come to the maximum to be 'near' it, the statute
does not license the Commission to select as the relevant 'maxi-
mum term' a sentence that is different from the congressionally
authorized maximum term." 2
Finally, the Court addressed the two rationales that the Com-
mission used to enact Amendment 506 in the first place. The ma-
jority readily dismissed the double counting argument as "entirely
beside the point," 3 holding that "[t]he number of steps the Com-
mission employs to achieve [the statutory maximum] requirement is
unimportant, provided the Commission's mechanism results in
sentences 'at or near' the 'maximum term authorized."'' The
Court then made equally short shrift of the Commission's argument
that prosecutorial discretion would result in unwarranted sentencing
disparities among similarly situated defendants:
Insofar as prosecutors, as a practical matter, may be able to
determine whether a particular defendant will be subject to
the enhanced statutory maximum, any such discretion
would be similar to the discretion a prosecutor exercises
when he decides what, if any, charges to bring against a
criminal suspect. Such discretion is an integral part of the
criminal justice system, and is appropriate, so long as it is
not based upon improper factors. Any disparity in the
maximum statutory penalties between defendants who do
and those who do not receive the notice is a foresee-
able-but hardly improper-consequence of the statutory
notice requirement.'
Having rejected each of the Respondents' arguments as to why
Amendment 506 was valid, and having satisfied itself that the
Amendment conflicted with federal law, the Court reversed the
judgment of the First Circuit.
61. Id. (quoting United States v. Fountain, 83 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 1996)).
6 Id. at 1678.
61 Id. at 1679.
6& a
" Id. (citations omitted).
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B. Justice Breyer's Dissent
In contrast to the majority, Justice Breyer' found that the
phrase "maximum term authorized" is fraught with ambiguity'
and that the crux of the issue is, "authorized by what?"' Justice
Breyer concluded that "once one understands the need to engage in
rather complex exercises in statutory interpretation to separate out,
from the set of all potentially applicable sentencing statutes, those
to which the word 'authorized' refers, one understands that the
referent of that word 'authorized' is not obvious." '69 After analyz-
ing the background sentencing law as well as the legislative history
of § 994(h), the dissent concluded that no one on the Court could
find "a clear indication of what Congress must have meant by its
open-ended term 'authorized."' 70
Aside from Justice Breyer's uncertainty as to what authority
sanctioned use of the enhanced statutory maximum, he also found
the majority's opinion "regrettable" for its policy implications.7'
He noted that Congress created the Commission to ensure a "fair
and more rational sentencing system" and that "courts, when
interpreting the authorizing Act, should recall Congress' overriding
objectives" 3 when it passed the Sentencing Reform Act.
IH. ANALYSIS-WHY FAIR IS FouL
LaBonte's most immediate impact will be the perpetuation of a
Draconian drug sentencing system. Although there are obvious
moral concerns when drug dealers are sentenced to thirty years
while persons convicted of "ethnic cleansing" receive twenty
years,74 there are other legal and policy reasons that suggest that
the dissenting justices and the Sentencing' Commission embraced
the more just approach to this issue.
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens joined Justice Breyer in his dissent. See id. at 1679.
67. See id. at 1679.
6 Id. at 1682.
69 Id. at 1683.
Id. at 1686.
7. See id. at 1688.
7.Id.
r LaBonte, 117 S.Ct. at 1688.
71 On July 14, 1997, the United Nations war crimes tribunal sentenced Dusan Tadic
to a twenty year prison term after he was convicted of various war crimes. See A
Bosnian Serb Gets 20 Years for War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1997, at A4.
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A. The Purposes of the Criminal Sentence are Satisfied by Use of
the Unenhanced Statutory Maximum
Congress has stated four purposes to be served by the imposi-
tion of a criminal sentence. Sentences are to (1) reflect the serious-
ness of the offense and to provide just punishment; (2) afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant; and (4) provide the defendant with
the needed educational training or vocational training in the most
effective manner.' There are several reasons why the Court's de-
cision fails to implement these mandates.
1. The Unenhanced Statutory Maximum Reflects the Seriousness
of the Offense and Does Not Undermine Other Goals of
Sentencing
Sentences are to reflect the seriousness of the offense.7 In
many instances, the sentences the Guidelines promulgate exceed
this directive and require the sentencing judge to impose sentences
that many consider too severe. Some of the most dramatic exam-
ples of excessive sentencing are found in narcotics offenses, where
the punishments are routinely criticized by the federal judiciary.
Judicial discontent is most clearly typified by the actions of Senior
District Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New
York and Senior Judge Whitman Knapp of the Southern District of
New York. In 1993 each took advantage of his senior status on the
bench to announce that he would use his case-selection discretion
to refuse assignment to any drug cases.'
The philosophical reactions of these two judges can hardly be
considered the exception. In 1993, the New York Times reported
that "about 50 of the 680 Federal judges are refusing to take drug
cases."'78 In addition, Chief Judge Mikva of the District Court for
the District of Columbia publicly thanked that district's United
States Attorney for declining to prosecute drug cases that the U.S.
Attorney concluded belonged in local courts.79 Judge Pettine of
' See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1994).
76 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1994) ("The court, in determining the particular
sentence to be imposed, shall consider... the need for the sentence imposed to reflect
the seriousness of the offense.").
. See Joseph B. Treaster, 2 U.S. Judges, Protesting Policies, Are Declining to Take
Drug Cases, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at Al.
7L Id.
" See Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
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the First Circuit has also expressed his difficulties with the Guide-
lines: "I find myself taking exception to the mechanical sentencing
that the guidelines force upon judges, and I find it painful to ad-
here to this impersonal and cold-blooded process."'
The defense bar has also noted the judiciary's dislike of the
Guidelines81 as have academics." Considering the dissatisfaction
that exists among those who must deal with the Guidelines on a
regular basis, it is important to ensure that the Guidelines, if they
are indeed as Draconian as some suggest, are reworked to reflect
more mainstream notions of justice. Although Amendment 506 was
a step in this direction, the LaBonte Court effectively nullified this
gain.
In addition to adequately reflecting the seriousness of the of-
fense, one could argue that use of the unenhanced statutory maxi-
mum would have no negative implications toward the other goals
of sentencing. There does not appear to be any reason why a max-
imum penalty of twenty years does not adequately reflect the seri-
ousness of the offense and thereby satisfy the retributive theory.
Such a lengthy term of imprisonment also satisfies the incapacita-
tion theory by keeping the defendant away from the public for
twice the duration of the typical criminal career." Twenty years
also satisfies the deterrence theory by sending a message that soci-
ety will not tolerate criminal behavior and will severely punish the
criminal who transgresses the statute.
Circuit, 160 F.R.D. 169, 222 (1994) ("We [the court] appreciate [the U.S. Attorney's] ef-
forts to see that we do not end up as a receptacle for all of the drug cases... simply
because the sentencing guidelines are as draconian as they are.").
United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 199, 204 (1st Cir. 1994) (Pettine, J., concurring)
(describing the sentencing court's belief that a 27 year sentence was excessive and was
not a proper basis for departure from the guidelines).
S" See Harry A. Silvergate, Boston Bar Journal Sentencing Guidelines, BOSTON B.J.
Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 17 ('[Almong judges who have the luxury of following their con-
sciences in matters of case selection, a disturbingly large number have chosen not to tread
where federal sentencing guidelines result in particularly unconscionable miscarriages of
justice.").
' See Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither out
Far nor in Deep," 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 739 (1995) ("Mhe federal courts
have been weeping and gnashing their teeth over the deluge of drug cases and the draco-
nian sentences being imposed under the federal sentencing guidelines.").
8 The typical criminal career lasts for approximately ten years. See Peter Greenwood,
Sentencing, in THE PREDICTION OF CRaINAL VIoLENCE 123, 124 (1987).
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2. Use of the Unenhanced Statutory Maximum Permits Adequate
Consideration of the Defendant's Criminal History
Congress made it clear that when imposing a sentence, a court
should consider the defendant's history and characteristics." In
response to this mandate, the Commission drafted chapter four of
the Guidelines which considers the convicted criminal's criminal
history and criminal livelihood. In the introductory commentary to
chapter four, the Commission notes that "[a] defendant's record of
past criminal conduct is directly relevant to"' the four goals of
sentencing.' In addition, the Commission states that "[a] defen-
dant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than
a first offender,"" and that "[g]eneral deterrence of criminal con-
duct dictates that a clear message be sent to society that repeated
criminal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each
recurrence."
8
The Career Offender Guideline is found in section 4B1.1 of the
Guidelines. 9 A defendant qualifies as a "career offender" if (1)
the defendant is at least eighteen years old at the time of the in-
stant offense, (2) the instant offense is a felony that is either a
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a
crime of violence of a controlled substance offense." On its face,
section 4Bl.1 appears to adequately consider the defendant's crimi-
nal record, and with statutes that do not have enhancement provi-
sions, it does. However, consideration of the statutory maximum is
not the only means by which section 4Bl accounts for the
defendant's prior record. This history is also considered by auto-
matically placing a career offender in the highest criminal history
category." Defendants who are convicted under a drug statute
have their criminal history considered once by an increase in the
offense level and a second time by automatic placement into cate-
" See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1994) ("The court, in determining the particular sen-
tence to be imposed, shall consider ... the history and characteristics of the defendant.").
GUIDEUNE, supra note 3, at ch. 4 pt. A (Introductory Commentary).
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
'" GuEDnENES, supra note 3, at ch. 4 pt. A (Introductory Commentary).
8 GUiEINES, supra note 3, at ch. 4 pt. A (Introductory Commentary).
'" See GUIDEuNES, supra note 3, § 4B1.1.
See GUIDELINS, supra note 3, § 4B1.1.
91. See GutDEINqES, supra note 3, § 4B1.1 ("A career offender's criminal history cate-
gory in every case shall be Category VI.").
1998]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
gory VI of the career offender axis. This necessarily exceeds the
mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which only requires consideration
of the defendant's criminal history.'
3. Use of the Unenhanced Statutory Maximum Would Help to
Ameliorate the Overcrowded Prison Problem
28 U.S.C. § 994(g) states: "The sentencing guidelines pre-
scribed under this chapter shall be formulated to minimize the
likelihood that the Federal prison population will exceed the capac-
ity of the federal prisons."93 However, the Guidelines have been
routinely criticized for failing to abide by this statute.' In 1992,
federal prisons were operating at 148% of their capacity" and
"with tough new laws calling for even longer sentences for repeat
offenders, experts worry that the numbers will rise even more
sharply."96 In light of the fact that prisons have five times the
population that they did thirteen years ago,' the repeal of Amend-
ment 506 and the resulting longer sentences are certain to exacer-
bate this problem. With the enactment of Amendment 506, the
Guidelines had taken a step towards solving the overcrowding
crisis. The Court's invalidation of the Amendment will do nothing
more than ensure that this problem continues to persist.
n See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994) ("The court, in determining the particular sen-
tence to be imposed, shall consider . .. the history and characteristics of the defendant.")
(emphasis added).
28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1994).
See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INI-
TIAL SENTENCING GUIDELNES AND PoucY STATEMENTS 53 (1987) ("Federal prison popu-
lations are likely to grow dramatically by the end of the century. However, the sentencing
guidelines alone will contribute only marginally to such growth."); Albert W. Alschuler,
The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CH. L. REV.
901, 936 (1991) ("[L]egislative directives to match sentences to resources have not always
proven effective."); Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation,
101 YALE LJ. 1755, 1763 (1992) ("[T]he Commission's policies have contributed in part
to an increase in the federal prison population from 42,000 in 1987 to a projected 72,000
in 1992."); Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States Sentencing Commission Miss?,
101 YALE LJ. 1773, 1784 (1992) ("The commission ignored this congressional directive
and developed its guidelines without concern for their effects on prison populations.").
" See J. Michael Quinlan, Intermediate Punishments as Sentencing Options, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 217, 218 (1992) (discussing federal prison overcrowding).
' Leslie Helm, Factories with Fences: Oregon's ambitious prison work program is
being closely scrutinized for ways to manage the rising cost of a growing prison popula-
tion, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, at Dl.
97 See id.
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4. Use of the Enhanced Statutory Maximum Does Not Guarantee
a Sentence "At or Near" the Statutory Maximum
One of the Court's major justifications for invalidating
Amendment 506 was that use of the unenhanced statutory maxi-
mum would not provide a sentence "at or near" the statutory maxi-
mum.98 However, the structure of the Guidelines exposes the
weaknesses of this argument. Recall that the Career Offender
Guideline provides a table of offense levels that correlates to the
"offense statutory maximum." Thus, the longer the maximum
penalty, the higher the offense level. A drug dealer sentenced using
the enhanced statutory maximum would be sentenced under an
offense level of 34."°
Now consider section 3El.1 of the Guidelines, which provides
for a two level reduction in the "offense level" in the event that
the defendant accepts responsibility for his criminal actions.'' It
is entirely possible that a defendant could be sentenced to the en-
hanced statutory maximum and still be granted a section 3El1
reduction. In this situation, a drug offender who faces an offense
level of 34 under the enhanced maximum penalty will be subject
to an offense level of 32. The disparity in the length of sentence
between levels 34 and 32 can be greater than five years. Thus,
when a defendant is sentenced to the enhanced maximum and is
granted a reduction for "acceptance of responsibility," the defendant
would not be sentenced "at or near" the maximum term authorized.
Reliance on the "at or near" argument requires acceptance of the
principle that reductions such as the one provided in section 3El.1
are also invalid because they conflict with the "at or near" lan-
guage of § 994(h).
B. Use of the Enhanced Statutory Maximum is Double Counting
"The notion that the use of the enhanced maximum amounts to
double counting ... stems from the fact that the defendant's prior
convictions trigger both the statutory enhancement and the Career
Offender Guideline. ' ' " Avoidance of this injustice was one of the
See United States v. LaBonte, 117 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 (1997).
. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
' See GUIDELME, supra note 3, § 4B1.1.
101. See GUImLINES, supra note 3, § 3El.l(a) ("If the defendant clearly demonstrates
acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.").
02 United States v. Hemandez, 79 F.3d 584, 599 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Commission's reasons for the enactment of Amendment 506.103
Currently, the federal circuits are divided into three groups as to
whether and when the Guidelines authorize double counting. Five
circuits hold that double counting is permissible except in those
instances where the guidelines expressly prohibit it."°4 Four others
hold that double counting is never permissible," 5 one of which
has even gone so far as to suggest that it is prohibited by the
Supreme Court. 6 Finally, two circuits take an intermediate ap-
proach, holding that "[d]ouble counting in the sentencing context
'is a phenomenon that is less sinister than the name implies,""'
yet remaining leery that district courts may over-step their bounds.
These courts take the view that double counting may be proper,
10. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
o See United States v. Wimbush, 103 F.3d 968, 970 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[D]ouble
counting a factor under different guidelines is permitted if the Commission intended that
result"); United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345, 359 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Double counting is
prohibited only if the particular guidelines at issue forbid it"); United States v. Wong, 3
F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he Sentencing Guidelines are explicit when double
counting is forbidden."); United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 895 (9th Cir. 1993)
("[T]here is nothing wrong with 'double counting' when it is necessary to make the
defendant's sentence reflect the full extent of the wrongfulness of his conduct."); United
States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 1992) ("As we recently noted, '[t]he
Sentencing Commission plainly understands the concept of double counting, and expressly
forbids it where it is not intended."' (quoting United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204,
207 (4th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Curtis, 934 F.2d 553, 556 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Mhe
sentencing guidelines are explicit when double counting is prohibited.'); see also Thomas
R. Ascik, Annual Fourth Circuit Review for the Criminal Practitioner, 53 WAsH. & LEE
L. REV. 465, 544 (1996) (reviewing the Fourth Circuit's 1995 decisions on criminal is-
sues).
"o See United States v. Haines, 32 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Impermissible
double counting occurs when a district court imposes two or more upward adjustments
within the guidelines range, when both are premised on the same conduct." (emphasis
added)); United States v. Flinn, 18 F.3d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1994) C'Impermissible double
counting . . . occurs when the same conduct on the part of the defendant is used to sup-
port separate increases under separate enhancement provisions which necessarily over-
lap . . . and serve identical purposes."); United States v. Romano, 970 F.2d 164, 166,
167 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[Ihe Commission did not intend for the same conduct to be pun-
ished cumulatively under separate Guidelines provisions."); United States v. Werlinger, 894
F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Mhe Sentencing Commission did not intend for multi-
ple Guidelines sections to be construed so as to impose cumulative punishment for the
same conduct").
'" See Romano, 970 F.2d at 167 ("A rule against double counting is consistent with
Supreme Court decisions that have required a clear expression of legislative intent to ap-
ply sentence enhancement provisions cumulatively.") (citing Werlinger, 894 F.2d at 1015;
Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 404-04 (1980); and Simpson v. United States, 435
U.S. 6, 12-13 (1978)).
". United States v. Lilly, 13 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v.
Zapata, 1 F.3d 46, 47 (lst Cir. 1993)).
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but that "courts should go quite slowly in implying further such
prohibitions [against double counting] where none are written."'' °
Despite the lack of agreement as to whether and when double
counting is permissible, all of the federal circuits defer to the Com-
mission when it explicitly states that a particular action is inper-
missible double counting. However, deference to the Commission is
not automatic. Recall that commentary enacted by the Commission
is authoritative so long as it does not conflict with the Constitution
or a federal statute and is not an erroneous reading of the guide-
line."9 Several federal appellate and district courts concluded that
use of the enhanced statutory maximum is not double counting and
that the Commission's commentary to Amendment 506 conflicts
with 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).
The Supreme Court answered the double counting issue in this
context by holding that "[tihe number of steps the Commission
employs to achieve [sentencing at the maximum penalty] is unim-
portant.""' Even before the Court's decision, several federal cir-
cuits rejected the double counting argument, opining that since the
Guidelines are not separate statutory provisions of penalties, there
can be no double counting."' While it is certainly true that the
additional penalty that is provided by section 4B1.l is not "stat-
utory," it nevertheless significantly enhances the defendant's term
of imprisonment. This argument, stating that because the Guidelines
are not statutory, there can be no double counting, plays on seman-
tics and denies reality. Regardless of whether or not the provision
is statutory, the fact remains that the use of the statutory maxi-
mum, along with section 4B1.1, penalizes the defendant twice for
the same prior criminal history. It is of no concern to a prisoner
whether an additional ten years in prison results from the Guide-
lines or from a sentencing statute.
" Id. at 19; see also, United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that double counting is always acceptable ex-
cept where explicitly prohibited is not the law in the Second Circuit). This suggests that
while some circumstances may warrant double counting, see, e.g., United States v. Then,
56 F.3d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1995) (consideration of an act that is relevant to two dimen-
sions of the guidelines is permissible), other forms are not. See Campbell, 967 F.2d 20,
24 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the use of one factor to calculate both the base offense
level and an upward departure violates the basic sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1994)).
" See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
United States v. LaBonte, 117 S.Ct. 1673, 1679 (1997).
See United States v. Moralez, 964 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 559 (9th Cir. 1989).
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C. A Case of Congressional Oversight
When the Commission originally drafted Amendment 506, it
observed "that when the instruction to the Commission that under-
lies section 4B1.1 [i.e. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)] was enacted ... the
enhanced statutory maximum sentences provided for recidivist drug
offenders did not exist.""1 2 The enhanced statutory maximum pro-
vision was incorporated as part of the Narcotics Penalties and En-
forcement Act of 1986 (the "NPEA"). However, the re-
quirement that. recidivists be sentenced "at or near" the statutory
maximum first appeared in the SRA. This Act was passed two
years prior to the NPEA. The fact that the enhanced statutory
maximum sentence did not exist when Congress enacted the SRA
raises the question of whether Congress was aware of the quagmire
that it was creating when it passed the enhancement provision.
Notwithstanding the construction that Congress is "generally pre-
sume[d] [to be] knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the
legislation it enacts,"' it appears that this issue may have es-
caped Congress' attention." 5 Both 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) and 21
U.S.C. § 841 were part of omnibus legislation. Had they been
enacted as individual statutes, or as part of the same Act, one
might have been able to argue that Congress was aware of what
was happening. Since this is not the case, it seems entirely reason-
able that given the small fraction of each Act that these statutes
represent, even the most scrupulous legislator would not have fore-
seen the sentencing discrepancies that have resulted.
D. Prosecutorial Discretion is Undesirable in this Situation
One of the greatest problems with the use of the enhanced
statutory maximum is that it does not automatically apply to all
similarly situated defendants. If the prosecuting attorney wishes to
impose the increased penalty,"6 the prosecutor simply files an en-
hancement that states the defendant's previous convictions." 7 One
"2 UNrrED STATES SENTENCING COmMssION, supra note 11, at 804-05.
". Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 (1986).
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988).
"5 Indeed, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer recognized that the ambiguity of §
994(h) "indicates that Congress simply has not 'addressed the question.' of which maxi-
mum term to use. See LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1682 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Chev-
ron v. United States, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
"' This decision is left entirely to the prosecutor. See supra note 2.
7. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (1994) ("No person who stands convicted of an offense
under this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior
[Vol. 48:437
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of the Commission's reasons for enacting Amendment 506 was to
avoid disparate sentences based upon "the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in seeking enhanced penalties based on prior convic-
tions.' Although "[tihe notion that the prosecuting attorney is
vested with a broad range of discretion... is firmly entrenched in
American law,"" 9 this discretion is not unfettered. By enacting
Amendment 506, the Commission attempted to remedy a situation
where prosecutorial discretion resulted in disparate sentences be-
coming the norm.
The sentencing disparities that resulted from prosecutorial dis-
cretion came as no surprise. In 1979, the Federal Judicial Center
predicted that the proposed sentencing reform would "actually
aggravate the problems of discretion and sentencing disparities,
because the enormous discretion exercised by prosecutors would
not be brought under direct control."'" The report criticized the
transfer of discretion from the judiciary to prosecutors not only
because there was uncertainty as to whether the shift would reduce
disparities,' but also because judges generally tend to be older
and more experienced than prosecutors." Many practicing attor-
neys and academics have found that the Federal Judicial Center's
prediction has come to fruition." Yet another reason to avoid the
shift is that judges are intended to be neutral parties while prosecu-
tors are inherently partisan. Transferring sentencing discretion from
convictions, unless ... the United States attorney files an information with the ourt ...
stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon/1.
In. UNi'ED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 804, 805.
"9. 2 W. LAFAVE & D. ISRAEL, CRIBINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a), at 623 (2d ed.
1992); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (stating that pros-
ecutorial discretion is an inherent feature of criminal law enforcement).
1, 1 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, PROSECUToRiAL DISCREION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
REFORM 1-2 (1979).
... See id. at 1 ("It is by no means clear, however, that narrowing the discretion of
judges ... would reduce disparities or control the total amount of discretion exercised in
the criminal justice system.").
"z See id. at 2-3 ("Mhe quality of the discretion exercised might be adversely affect-
ed because, in effect, discretion would be transferred from federal district judges to assis-
tant United States attorneys ... [who] are almost uniformly far younger and less experi-
enced than district judges.").
"'3 See William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV.
373, 398 (1995) ("[T]he unbridled discretion of the judiciary that caused Congress to
overhaul the federal sentencing system has merely been transfered ...to the prosecutors
who are just as likely to exercise it differently from one to another. Disparity remains,
creating fertile ground for unfair sentencing.").
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a neutral party to a biased one is senseless if justice is indeed the
ultimate goal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Sentencing Guidelines were created to elimi-
nate unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated
defendants. Unfortunately, one way that the Guidelines approach
this problem is by meting out excessively harsh sentences to all. In
many cases, sentences go beyond reflecting the seriousness of the
defendant's offense and more than adequately account for the
defendant's criminal history. This phenomenon is particularly visi-
ble in drug cases. In light of the criticism that has been voiced in
this area, the Commission has been taking measures to correct the
situation. One of these measures was the enactment of Amendment
506.
Amendment 506 furthered the four traditional goals of sentenc-
ing. In addition, disparities were reduced by eliminating an area of
prosecutorial discretion which resulted in the disparate application
of enhanced statutory maximum provisions. Moreover, use of the
unenhanced statutory maximum to calculate the defendant's offense
level adequately reflected the seriousness of the offense. Despite
Amendment 506's positive attributes, the Supreme Court invalidat-
ed the Amendment. In its brief opinion in United States v.
LaBonte, the Supreme Court ensured that, in the area of drug sen-
tencing, unwarranted sentencing disparities will remain the norm
and justice will remain an elusive goal.
DANIEL I. SMULOW
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